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Abstract 
I trace the impact of the trans-Atlantic slave trade on the evolution of political authority in West 
Africa. I present econometric evidence showing that the trans-Atlantic slave trade increased 
absolutism in pre-colonial West Africa by approximately 17% to 35%, while reducing 
democracy and liberalism. I argue that this slavery-induced absolutism also influenced the 
structure of African political institutions in the colonial era and beyond. I present aggregate 
evidence showing that British colonies that exported more slaves in the era of the slave trade 
were ruled more-indirectly by colonial administrations. I argue that indirect colonial rule relied 
on sub-national absolutisms to control populations and extract surplus, and in the process 
transformed absolutist political customs into rule of law. The post-colonial federal authority, like 
the colonial authority before it, lacked the administrative apparatus and political clout to 
integrate these local authorities, even when they wanted to. From this perspective, state-failure in 
West Africa may be rooted in a political and economic history that is unique to Africa in many 
respects, a history that dates at least as far back as the era of the transatlantic slave trade.  
  
1 Department of Economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 48109. This paper has benefited from seminars at 
Washington University in St. Louis, The University of Michigan and Harvard University. I thank Nathan Nunn for 
very helpful editorial comments and Rob Gillezeau for research assistance. Remaining errors are mine.  
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 Since the publication of Douglas North's Structure and Change in Economic History (1981) 
social scientists have accumulated an abundance of new evidence showing how institutions 
shape the structure and performance of economies as they move through time. African 
economies are no exception. The term patrimonial (or neo-patrimonial) is controversial, but often 
used to describe a class of post-colonial African nation-states where a weak federal authority 
attempts to rule over ethnically-based local authorities. Political stability often rests upon an 
unstable coalition of patrons and clients who extract large amounts of national income through 
personal networks, intimidation, corruption and bribes.2 In these kinds of “failed-states” public 
policy is influenced more by a political calculation to retain the privileges of power than by the 
authority’s credible commitment to improve growth and welfare. The recent spread of 
democratic institutions like multi-party politics has improved accountability, but stability and 
violence are often more-pressing concerns. It is difficult for people to prosper under these 
conditions, unless of course they have access to a personal network of patrons and clients that 
defines the resources available to them.  
What are the historical origins of this type of political system? The traditional view links it to the 
era of colonial rule and how it birthed a disjointed and decentralized nation-state. Mamdani 
(1996) is perhaps the best-known proponent of this view. He sees the most-important political 
outcome of colonial rule to be a kind of dual legal system – European laws for colonial rulers 
and a variety of “customary” laws for colonial “subjects.” In a very real sense, the post-colonial 
nation-state is like the colonial state adjusted to new political realities like democratic elections, 
new global economic forces, stronger internal challenges and mounting international debt. 
2 See Pitcher, Moran and Johnston (2009) for a critical discussion of the term “patrimonial.” They argue against the 
use of the term. I agree with their critique, especially the charge that as a Weberian concept patrimonialism is 
inappropriately applied. I use the term to characterize a historically-specific solution to a political problem faced by 
many emerging post-colonial nation-states in Africa. My meaning is similar to the political formations described by 
van de Walle (2001), Boone (2003), Chabal and Daloz (1999) and Bates (2008), and is similar in many ways to 
Greif’s (1994) description of medieval Genoa before the Podesta, except the clients here are customary local 
authorities. 
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In this essay I argue that the historical roots go deeper than colonialism and can be found in the 
absolutist authority structures that emerged out of the slave trade era. To make my case I link the 
data on slave exports found in the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database (Eltis, 1999) with data on 
authority structures found in the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, 1967). My purpose is to see if 
the trans-Atlantic slave trade transformed local political authority in Africa prior to colonial 
occupation. I find that it did. I then suggest ways in which indirect colonial rule institutionalized 
these authority structures and transformed them into a kind of local rule of law that continues to 
extract surplus and challenge federal authority today. 
The Search for Origins and Path-Dependence 
In his book States and Power in Africa, Jeffrey Herbst (2000) advances the idea that a 
specifically African tradition of political authority is ancient in origin and rooted in Africa’s 
harsh physical environment, an environment that has always constrained population growth and 
elites’ capacity to broadcast political power. Herbst argues that low population density 
constrained the reach of political authority long before colonial rule. In fact, colonial authorities 
wrestled with the same physical constraints and failed, leaving behind a state apparatus too weak 
to govern effectively over its exogenously created political territories.   
Herbst is not the only scholar to invoke labor scarcity to explain an African institution. Anthony 
Hopkins (1973) in his widely-read economic history of Africa uses labor scarcity to explain 
technological choices and the institution of slavery. John Iliffe (2007), the renowned historian of 
Africa, uses labor scarcity to explain the institution of polygyny. Gareth Austin (2008) revises 
and extends the application of the idea, and James Fenske (2010) applies it to property rights. 
I believe there is a fundamental truth in this idea. Following the showing of the documentary 
film Eve, which argues that ancient Africans migrated out of Africa and populated the world, I 
ask my class: “if Africans could populate the world then why couldn’t they populate Africa?” If 
Africa was labor scarce then certainly it was the environment and not the people. The major 
problem with this view is not the idea but a lack of evidence. There are few census counts of an 
Africa population prior to the 20th century, and the widely-used estimates for earlier times found 
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in McEvedy and Jones (1978) are educated guesses and extrapolations of current estimates back 
in time. These types of exercises rely on a variety of counterfactual assumptions regarding 
historical rates of population growth and the impact of the slave trades on African populations 
(see Manning, 1990).  
Here I take a different approach. I use the fact that slave exports reduced African population. I 
then look to see if cross-sectional variations in slave exports can explain cross-sectional 
variations in institutions often ascribed to environmentally-induced labor scarcity. Thanks to the 
Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database some slave exports can be measured with a high degree of 
precision. In a very real sense, a focus on the slave trade opens the door to an 
empirically-grounded assessment of the population hypothesis, albeit a door with a slightly 
different view. Rather than seeing labor scarcity as the result of a steadfast environmental 
constraint, a focus on the slave trade emphasizes an economic shock to Africa.3 
This shock certainly reduced population, but it also set off a chain reaction of warfare and 
raiding among African societies that “changed the way wars were waged at the lowest level 
(Thornton, 1999, p. 151).” Robin Law, in his study of the Slave Coast concludes that “by the end 
of the seventeenth century, the European demand for slaves had brought about a profound 
transformation of African societies of the Slave Coast. Although this was primarily an economic 
transformation, it had dramatic effects in the political sphere also, in the collapse of political 
order leading to the rise of the new state of Dahomey” (Law 1991, p. 345). One finds similar 
conclusions in Barry’s (1998) study of the Senegambia region and Daaku’s (1970) study of the 
Gold Coast. Inikori (1982, 2003) argues that the slave trade encouraged the formation and spread 
of banditry and small militarized states. And in a review of Herbst’s States and Power in Africa, 
James Robinson (2002) argues that we should “…hypothesize that slavery-induced predatory 
institutions had significant adverse influence on development paths not just in the Americas 
where the slaves were used, but also in Africa where the slaves originated… Nonetheless, this is 
ultimately an empirical issue (2002, p. 517-518)." 
3 For two estimates of the shock see Whatley and Gillezeau (2011a) and Gemery and Hogendorn (1979). 
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A decade later, and with a few notable exceptions, the idea that the slave trade altered African 
political institutions remains largely untested. Whatley and Gillezeau (2011a) model both effects 
mentioned above. They treat the slave trade as an increase in the market value of anyone who 
can be enslaved. The shock alters factor prices in a way that mimics labor scarcity but it also 
turns political incentives to build states into economic incentives to raid for slaves. The model 
predicts decentralized and militarized absolutist political authorities more-interested in raiding 
for slaves than growing citizens. Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) present evidence showing that 
centuries of slaving in Africa fomented mistrust among people and towards their institutions, and 
that this slavery-induced mistrust persists to today. Whatley and Gillezeau (2011b) present 
evidence that the slave trade increased ethnic fragmentation in Africa and that this too persists to 
today. Nunn (2008) finds that slaving hampered long-term economic progress. Among the many 
possible channels is its impact on economic and political institutions. 
In this essay I follow these leads and ask if the slave trade influenced the institutions of authority 
in Africa and whether or not these influences persist over the long-term. I am not concerned with 
assessing the relative importance of environment versus shock. It could very-well be the case 
that the slave trade merely tightened a labor constraint that had been binding for millennia. I do 
not offer a way to distinguish between these two views, nor am I particularly concerned to. My 
goal is more limited -- to trace the long-term effects of the slave trade on the evolution of 
political authority in Africa. 
As such, the effects, if any, must pass through colonialism. Did slavery-induced pre-colonial 
authority structures survive colonial occupation? The literature is surprisingly silent on this 
question. Herbst (2000) devotes an entire chapter of States and Power to a discussion of 
authority in pre-colonial Africa but he never mentions the trans-Atlantic slave trade (2000, pp. 
35-57). Recent econometric studies of African political economy show how remnants of 
pre-colonial authority continue to influence local outcomes in Africa, but none of these studies 
consider the possibility that the pre-colonial legacies they identify are traditions of authority that 
date back to the slave trade era (Englebert, 2000; Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos 
and Papailoannou, 2010, 2011). Historians consider the link between the slave trade and African 
politics, but with the exception of a few radical historians like Walter Rodney (1972) and Basil 
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Davidson (1992) they are not particularly interested in the long-term impact on development.  
Causal history is. It is an empirical project expressly designed to statistically identify and 
estimate causal relationships between past events and subsequent outcomes (see Nunn (2009) 
and Fenske (2010) for recent reviews). This line of research often produces the first salvo in the 
search for historical legacies, and institutions often take center stage as carriers of legacies.4 
Like a pulling guard on the gridiron, causal history suggests that some paths forward are more 
likely than others. The actual play, however, unfolds on the ground. As Paul David (1975) put it 
in his classic article on the economics of QWERTY, "... it is sometimes not possible to uncover 
the logic (or illogic) of the world around us except by understanding how it got that way (page 
332)." Avner Grief (2006) has theorized on the concept "path of play" in historical settings and 
has focused attention on how self-enforcing institutions of social cooperation (the shared 
playbook in our football analogy) can order how the play unfolds.  
In the remainder of this essay I follow the leads of this causal history of Africa and trace the 
impact of societal participation in the trans-Atlantic slave trade on the evolution of political 
authority. I present econometric evidence showing how the trans-Atlantic slave trade caused 
absolutism to spread in sub-Saharan West Africa. I argue that slavery-induced absolutism also 
influenced the way politics were played in the colonial era and beyond. I present aggregate 
evidence that British colonies that exported more slaves were ruled more indirectly by colonial 
administrations. I argue that the implementation of indirect colonial rule institutionalized African 
absolutisms and transformed them into a kind of rule of law at the local level. The post-colonial 
nation-state, like the colonial state before it, lacks the administrative apparatus or the political 
clout to integrate these local authorities, even when they want to. From this perspective, the 
political structure of many post-colonial nation-states in Africa is rooted in a political history that 
is unique to Africa in many respects, a history that stretches at least as far back as the era of the 
transatlantic slave trade.  
The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade and Political Authority in Africa 
4 On path-dependence as legacy in competitive equilibrium, see Arrow (2004). 
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Slave trading in Africa has a long and nuanced history. How are we to think of it as a shock to 
Africa? It is best to begin with the position of Africa in medieval Mediterranean civilization. 
Italian city-states, Arab caliphates and European kingdoms all used conquest and trade to obtain 
treasure, land and slaves. Muslim and Christian armies fought “just” wars that justified the 
enslavement of non-believers. Roman and Islamic law contained well-developed civil codes 
regulating the legal status of slaves (Patterson, 1982).  
The southern frontier of this system was Africa, down its east coast by sea and across the Sahara 
desert by camel. By the middle of the 15th century lateen sails enabled Portuguese caravels to sail 
down the west coast of Africa as well. Then the discovery of the Americas, the decimation of 
American populations and the transplantation of slave codes across the Atlantic. In the hands of 
the emerging capitalist nations of Europe, the proximity of cheap African labor was an 
opportunity to profit from and defend their American colonies. By the beginning of the 18th 
century, an old and sporadic long-distance African trade in slaves had become the export engine 
of growth (Eltis, 1994; Eltis and Jennings, 1994; Bean, 1974; Gemery and Hogendorn, 1990). 
The real price of slave exports rose 500% in the 18th century (Richardson, 1991; Eltis and 
Richardson, 2004). Slave exports increased by 1000% (Eltis, 2009).  
Asking about the effects of these slave trades on the evolution of political authority in Africa 
might seem far-fetch, but we can focus the question and break it down into stages. Nunn (2008) 
asks if there is a correlation between the numbers of slaves coming out of different regions of 
Africa and the economic performance of those regions today. His is an ambitious attempt to 
locate and count up all of the slaves taken by the trans-Saharan, Indian Ocean, Red Sea and 
trans-Atlantic trades. He then looks to see if slave exports in the past correlate with GDP levels 
today. After controlling for a variety of other factors that might explain the correlation, including 
reverse-causality, he concludes that slaving and slave trading depressed long-term economic 
growth. His estimates of slave exports have been used by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), 
Whatley and Gillezeau (2011b) and others, with similar results.  
Here I adopt a slightly different empirical approach, one designed to better isolate the slave trade 
as a shock to Africa. First, I limit the analysis to the trans-Atlantic slave trade because these data 
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are much more reliable than data on the trans-Saharan, Red Sea or Indian Ocean trades. The 
trans-Atlantic slave trade evolved as a core component of European mercantile systems operating 
in the Atlantic. Records of ship manifests, government agencies, insurance companies and 
newspapers have been digitized into the widely-used Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database. 
Estimates of the Muslim-based trades are much less reliable in terms of volume, dates and places 
(Austen, 1979, 1987).  
Second, I confine the analysis to the trans-Atlantic slave trade on the west coast of Africa. After 
1807 the trans-Atlantic slave trade expanded on the east coast of Africa to avoid British efforts to 
suppress the trade on the west coast. I exclude the east coast extension because East African 
societies had previously been influenced by the Indian Ocean and Red Sea trades, for which 
slave export data are much less precise.  
Third, there is little evidence of much slave trading along the west coast of Africa prior to the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade. Evidence on West African slave trading in the 15th and early 16th 
centuries is very thin (Fage, 1980). Most of the slave-trading along the Upper Guinea Coast and 
in the Western Sudan were southern extensions of the Muslim-based Mediterranean system, and 
were centered on Lake Chad and the interior delta of the Niger River (Lovejoy, 2004; Fisher, 
2001). Rodney (1966) surveys evidence for the Upper Guinea Coast and finds slaves as servants 
in the households of elites, as elsewhere in the Mediterranean world, but little evidence of the 
kind of systematic slave raiding and slave marketing that would become the norm centuries later.  
True, by the time the Portuguese arrived on the Lower Guinea Coast in the late-15th century the 
Muslim-based network had extended as far south as the Gold Coast of present-day Ghana. Wilks 
(1993) documents how Muslim traders from the north supplied the gold-mining Akan of Ghana 
with the slave workforce they needed to clear their rainforests for agriculture. Not to be outdone, 
Portuguese traders stimulated a second slave trade into the Akan gold fields. They sailed yachts 
back and forth along the Lower Guinea Coast, purchasing war captives from Benin’s political 
expansion further down the coast and selling them to the Akan for their gold. (Graham, 1965; 
Wilks 1982; Ryder, 1969). These are certainly slave trades and they certainly predate the 18th 
century explosion in the trans-Atlantic trade, but they are long-distance slave trades and precisely 
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because societies along the west coast of Africa were much less predatory than they would 
become by the 18th century (Law, 1991; Thornton, 1999; Daaku, 1970).  
Finally, not only is the magnitude of the shock and its timing better-measured on the west coast 
of Africa, so too is its location. Most of the 34,000 voyages found in the Trans-Atlantic Slave 
Trade Database have some information on the location of slave purchases. Sometimes location is 
by port. I use GIS software to merge the locations of slave ports with the locations of African 
societies found in Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas. Murdock’s goal was to code the ethnographic 
features of societies prior to substantial European influence. I look to see if slaving influenced 
the authority structures of these societies, so in a sense I am testing Murdock as well. 
Figure 1 depicts how I merged the two data sets. The mapping of sub-national societies comes 
from the digitized version of the map found in Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas (1967). I overlay 
on top of this the locations of the slave ports found in the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database. 
These are denoted by the stars along the coast. I then construct 200 observations from the 
merged spatial data. I divide the west coast of Africa into 200 evenly-spaced points, each 50 km 
apart, running from Tunis, Tunisia to Cape Town, South Africa. The dependent and independent 
variables are constructed from spatial data that fall within predefined buffers around these points. 
These are depicted by the circles in Figure 1.  
The treatment variable is the numbers of slaves exported from the ports in these buffers 
(SLAVES). Environmental controls are the average values of environmental features inside these 
buffers (X): forest and desert coverage, elevation, local agricultural suitability as measured by 
climate and terrain slope, and population density in 1960 (UNESCO, 2010; USGS, 2010; IIASA, 
2010). The dependent variables are three authority types derived from variable V72 in the 
Ethnographic Atlas called “Succession to the Office of Local Headman.” This variable is 
dichotomized three different ways. ABSOLUTIST = 1 for Murdock’s code 1 = “patrilineal heir,” 
and code 2 = “matrilineal heir;” ABSOLUTIST = 0 otherwise. LIBERAL = 1 for Murdock’s 
code 5 = “influence, wealth or social status, nonhereditary;” LIBERAL = 0 otherwise. 
DEMOCRATIC = 1 for Murdock’s code 6 = “election or other formal consensus, 
nonhereditary;” DEMOCRATIC = 0 otherwise. 
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Table 1 reports un-weighted means. The first three columns report means for the Western sample 
-- the entire 200 buffer sample covering the western half of the continent of Africa from Tunis, 
Tunisia to Cape Town, South Africa. The top panel is for buffers with a 250km radius. The 
bottom panel is for buffers with a 500 km radius.  On average, 316,050 slaves were exported 
from each of the 200 buffers with a 250km radius.5 117 of the 200 buffers have at least one 
ethnic group with information on authority type. The un-weighted averages show 62 percent of 
these societies being governed by absolutist authority, 16 percent being governed by democratic 
authority and only 3 percent having liberal or wealth-based rules of ascension to headship. 180 of 
the 500km buffers have information on authority type. The number of hits is larger because the 
larger buffers cover more territory and have a higher probability of containing at least one ethnic 
group with information on authority type. 
The next three columns report means for the Atlantic sample, a sample of observations that 
begins at approximately Gibraltar and run to Cape Town. This sample covers the African 
coastline that faces the Atlantic Ocean and the Americas. It excludes the African coastline that 
faces the Mediterranean. The number of observations falls to 169. The average number of slave 
per observation increases to 374,020. Absolutism increases to 84 percent.  
The third sample is the Sub-Saharan sample, and begins near Cape Blanc on the southern edge of 
the Sahara desert. The number of observations declines to 131, slave exports increase to 482,520 
and absolutism increases to 88 percent. All of the slaves in all of the samples were captured and 
exported from sub-Saharan Africa. The sample on authority type gets small (48 observations), 
but it serves as a check on the others by making sure an estimated impact of exports on 
authority-type is not being identified off of unobserved regional heterogeneity.  
5 This implies over 100 million slave exports, but the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database contains information on 
approximately 13 million slave exports. The discrepancy is due to the overlap of buffers causing each port’s slave 
exports to be recorded more than once. The center of each buffer is 50kms away from the next center. With a radius 
of 250 km (or a diameter of 500km) the coast is canvased once if we take the average exports of every 10th buffer. 
200/10=20, which yields 20x316,050=6,321,000 slave exports. The Transatlantic Slave Trade Database has specific 
port information for approximately 6,494,200 West African slave exports, so our ports pick up almost all of the 
slave exports that have information on port. 
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The null hypothesis is loosely derived from Whatley and Gillezeau (2011a), where slaving is 
modeled as a violent production process -- what Patterson (1982) calls “social death.” The 
increased violence increases individuals’ demands for protection -- a public good best provided 
by political authorities who have the power to authorize and co-ordinate a defense (or offense). 
Like all individuals in times of war, individuals subject to slave capture will pay more for 
protection, including relinquishing freedoms and rights that might otherwise be cherished in 
times of peace. It is not inconceivable that centuries of slaving created an environment where 
peace had become a distant memory -- where a state of war seemed like a natural state of affairs. 
A rough calculation reported in Whatley and Gillezeau (2011a) estimates that between 1700 and 
1850 a West African person faced a one-in-five chance of being swept up in the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade sometime in their life. Under these conditions it is not inconceivable that individuals 
will relinquish political rights and accept absolute rule (Bates, Grief and Singh, 2002). It is not 
inconceivable for political authority to become more absolutist in nature where previously there 
had been some semblance of democratic or liberal influence on authority. 
I look for evidence of this by performing the following OLS regressions: 
AUTHORITY TYPEji = α + β SLAVESi + Ω Xi + vi 
Observations are buffers. AUTHORITY TYPEji is the average value of AUTHORITY TYPEj 
(ABSOLUTE, LIBERAL or DEMOCRATIC) for ethnic groups whose centroids fall in buffer i. 
SLAVESi is the total number of slaves exported from the slave ports in buffer i. Environmental 
variables are mean values for territories in the buffers. Xi is the vector of environmental control 
variables. vi is the error term. The larger circular buffers reach farther inland, but they overlap 
more along the coast. I calculate Conley standard errors to account for spatial correlation in 
errors across observations. 
OLS results are reported in the columns labeled OLS in Table 2. In the 250 km samples, slave 
exports are positively and statistically significantly correlated with absolutist authority. All of the 
estimated coefficients are positive and significant at the 99 percent confidence level. The 
correlation is also large. Mean slave exports explain between 16 and 40 percent of the absolutism 
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recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas. In the sub-Saharan sample the correlation is also significant 
and large.  
I interpret these correlations as if the direction of causality ran from slaving to absolutism, but 
there could be some reverse causation. Absolutist authority, for example, could have been a 
more-efficient way to organize slave raids, giving rise to a reverse correlation running from 
absolutism to slave exports. Also, Whatley and Gillezeau (2011a) discuss conditions under 
which absolutist rulers might authorize half-hearted defenses of their people. Coalition-building 
across ethnic groups required some degree of power-sharing among elites, but if elites could 
insulate themselves from capture, and if they cared little about the welfare of their people, then 
they might prefer to leave their people exposed to capture so long as they themselves were safe. 
This outcome may be more-likely where authority is inherited and absolute, and less likely in 
democratic systems where leaders are held accountable.  
In an effort to identify a causal relationship that runs from slaving to absolutism I perform a 
two-stage instrumental variables estimation of the relationship between slaving and absolutism. 
In the first stage I seek a set of exogenous predictors of slave exports that are uncorrelated with 
the error terms vi. Here I make use of the instruments developed by Nunn (2008), which in this 
case are the distances between the center of each buffer and the nearest destination in the 
Americas and North Africa.6 These distances, plus the environmental controls, capture 
variations in slave exports that are not likely to be correlated with authority type. In the second 
stage I look for correlations between these estimated slave exports and absolutism. In the second 
stage I also control for the impact of environment on the adoption of absolutist authority. I rely 
on Hansen-Sargan tests of over-identification restrictions to test for the absence of correlations 
between first-stage estimates of slave exports and the error terms vi.  
In Table 3 I report first-stage regressions of slave exports on distance and environmental 
controls. These are reduced form equations so it is difficult to interpret coefficients, but the 
6 The American destinations are Virginia, Havana, Haiti, Kingston, Dominica, Guyana, Salvador, Rio de Janeiro, 
and the North African destinations are Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, Bengahzi, Cairo. 
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F-statistics and the R-squares show that the exogenous regressors capture a significant amount of 
the variation in slave exports. In general, distance to the Americas offered some protection 
against capture. Also, fewer slaves were exported from desert regions and from higher 
elevations. This could be due to fewer people living in these regions, but some of the population 
effect is already captured by the variables measuring agricultural suitability and 1960 population, 
so desert and elevated regions may have also provided some refuge from slavers (Nunn and 
Puga, 2012). 
The second-stage results are reported in the columns labeled IV in Table 2. In the Western 
sample of 250 km buffers, the coefficient on slave exports loses statistical significance, but as we 
move towards sub-Saharan Africa the estimated coefficients get larger and tighter. In the 
sub-Saharan sample, 16.9-34.8 percent of average observed absolutism is explained by average 
slave exports. The relationship between slave exports and absolutism is less apparent in the 500 
km samples. All of the coefficients are still positive but they fail to achieve significance, except 
in the Western sample. It is not clear why this is the case. One possibility is that the impact of 
slaving is less direct farther inland. Most of the slaves pulled into the orbit of the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade originated within 250-300 kilometers of the coast, although after the late 18th century 
higher slave prices covered longer treks to the coast. There are 48 observations in the 
sub-Saharan sample that have both 250 km and 500 km buffers. Absolutism is 88 percent in the 
smaller buffer but declines to 72 percent in the larger buffers that reach farther inland. The 
student-t statistic on difference in means is 3.46.  
Not finding significant effects farther inland does not necessarily mean the impact of the slave 
trade was limited to the coast, although it does mean the issue deserves further investigation. The 
relationship could have becomes less direct and more complex as the process moved inland. 
Also, the inland areas were subject to slave raiding for shorter periods of time, so inland peasants 
might have been more successful at resisting extreme revolutions in authority. The empirical 
strategy in this essay captures only revolutionary changes across categories of authority, from 
non-absolutist to absolutist. It does not capture increases in the degree of absolutism within 
authority types, something that was undoubtedly occurring as well.  
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This interpretation finds some support in the regression for democracy and liberalism. These are 
reported in Tables 4 and 5. First note that all of the estimated coefficients have negative signs. 
Slaving tended to reduce liberalism and democracy. There are no liberal societies in the 250 km 
sub-Saharan sample, but there are some in the sample that reaches 500 km inland. Slaving 
reduced liberalism, even in the interior of sub-Saharan Africa. The results for democracy are also 
negative but they never achieve statistical significance in the sub-Saharan sample. Perhaps the 
designation “democratic” is flexible enough to absorb elements of absolutism while retaining 
some degree of accountability, like in the case of the Asante kingdom situated inland from the 
Gold Coast (Wilks, 1975; Rattray, 1929)   
Patriarchy is another form of authority, and George Murdock (1949, 1967) claims to have 
theoretically proven that much of the patriliny in pre-colonial West Africa was of recent 
historical origin. His proof is based on the observation that many pre-colonial West African 
societies with patrilineal rules of descent retained legacy kinship terms more appropriate for 
other lineage systems. Not being a historian, and having never set foot in Africa, Murdock never 
claimed that the slave trade transformed lineage rules, but his list of possible causes could have 
easily included it. Basil Davidson (1992), the preeminent historian of Africa who chronicled 
Africa’s history from slavery to the present, does highlight slaving. He states, “As the slaving 
state became increasingly a predator, kinship systems were strengthened and elaborated as a 
means of providing protection against the dangers of the violence created by the slave trade (p. 
266).” Predation not only shifted more power onto already-powerful men but it may have also, as 
Ekeh argues, increased the “entrenchment of kinship corporation (1990, p. 660).”  
From Predation to Rule of Law 
What about colonialism? How did colonialism interact with these new slavery-induced predatory 
political customs? Over the past decade a series of influential articles has laid the empirical 
foundation for approaching this type of question. One strand of this literature searches for the 
long-term impact of the legal customs transplanted around the world by European colonizing 
authorities, contrasting primarily the experiences of common law countries and civil law 
countries (La Porta, 2008; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002). Another series of articles by Acemoglu, 
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Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) emphasizes the long-run impact of colonial property rights 
laws laid down by European colonial authorities. In colonies where the colonizer’s strategy (or 
capability) was to settle and produce, one tends to find property rights systems that constrain 
states’ rights to expropriate surplus from producers. Where incentives to settle and produce were 
not so great, the colonial authority tended to establish institutions that facilitated resource 
extraction, and often by force. Over the long-term, settler institutions encouraged economic 
development while extractive institutions did not. 
These are useful perspectives, but one needs to be careful when applying them to Africa. 
Incorporating the trans-Atlantic slave trade can help. First, David Albouy (forthcoming) argues 
that thus far the settler data are not good enough to test for the long-term effects of extraction vs. 
settlement in Africa. The slave trade was definitely an extractive institution, and the numbers on 
export volumes are good measure of how extractive it was across time and place.  
Second, it is important to note that prior to the Berlin Conference of 1885 the official 
colonization of Africa was confined to a few coastal protectorates. Most of Africa was officially 
colonized for less than 75 years, contrasting sharply with other areas of the world like the 
Americas, the Caribbean, India and many parts of Asia. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001, footnote 1) interpret the slave trade as an extractive colonial institution, but others do not. 
Olsson (2009), for example, presents evidence that the length of colonial rule encouraged the 
development of democratic institutions over the long-term, but he defines colonialism in Africa 
as formal colonial occupation. Given the impact of the slave trade on political customs in Africa, 
incorporating the slave trade as a phase of colonialism might help explain why African 
democracy differs from democracy in other former-colonies around the world. 
Finally, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) argue that property rights institutions have had a greater 
impact on structure and performance than have legal origins because inefficient legal rules can 
be circumvented by the private ordering of contracts (Grief, 1989). There are a number of 
studies, however, documenting the lasting impact of legal origin in Africa, although the channels 
are not always clear. Colonies under British rule, and therefore administered by common law 
traditions, tend to exhibit higher post-colonial incomes per capita, more investments in education 
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and higher rates of school enrollment than do colonies administered by French civil codes (Grier, 
1999; Bertocchi and Canova, 2002; and Price, 2003).  
One possible explanation has to do with the way the legal customs of colonizer and colonized 
interacted to shape the institutions of colonial rule. Sir Frederick Lugard, 1st Governor-General 
of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, is generally considered to be the architect of the 
British policy of indirect rule, but Mamdani and Herbst argue that the policy evolved on the 
ground, as a solution to the problem of controlling colonial subjects. Mamdani (1996) argues that 
indirect colonial rule grew out of a recognition that direct rule, a single legal system 
encompassing colonizer and colonized but peppered with racial distinctions, was untenable in the 
long-term because it encouraged class-based and race-based protests against injustices. 
Gradually colonial authorities moved toward a sharing of power with real or imagined local 
chiefs who controlled real or imagined “customary” lands. Herbst (2000), in contrast, argues that 
indirect rule evolved out of a colonial recognition that broadcasting centralized authority over 
African territory was too costly to be effective.  
Here the legal customs of colonizers can matter in reshaping the political landscape. 
Firmin-Sellers (2000), for example, compares the institutions of French and English indirect 
colonial rule among the ethnically-similar Akan peoples who straddled the colonial border 
between the Ivory Coast and Ghana. Consistent with civil law tradition, the French colonial 
system was designed to achieve a clear directive from above: maximize tax collection. They 
undermined the authority of paramount chiefs, chose lower-order divisional chiefs as their 
agents, took periodic censuses of the population to estimate potential tax revenue, paid chiefs a 
share of the taxes they collected, and monitored chiefs' performance by comparing collected 
taxes against expected taxes.  
The British, on the other hand, careful not to undermine local custom (read common law), chose 
the higher-order paramount chiefs as their agents and allowed them to rule over the divisional 
chiefs and lineages below them. They paid chiefs a fixed salary and deposited tax collections in a 
public treasury for the development of public works. The British did not monitor chiefs’ tax 
collection like the French did but instead monitored chiefs’ performance as public servants and 
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administrators of justice. Based on this case study one would conclude that the French system 
was a more efficient system of resource extraction but perhaps less developmental than the 
British system. 
One would also conclude that the colonial authorities, both French and British, empowered 
slavery-induced absolutist power structures. Figure 2 presents aggregate evidence which 
suggests that indirect colonial rule relied on the kind of absolutism I estimated in the previous 
section. The figure graphs the relationship between slave exports and the degree of indirect rule 
among British colonies in Africa. The unit of analysis is the post-colonial nation-state. The 
measure of indirect rule is taken from Lange (2004, 2009) and is the percentage of legal cases 
adjudicated in customary African courts. Slave exports per acre are taken from Nunn (2008). The 
Figure shows that indirect rule is positively and significantly correlated with past slave exports. 
This is understandable. The colonial goal is to control population and extract surplus. The 
political objective of indirect colonial rule is to take the overlapping authorities that kin, clans, 
patriarchs and elders previously used to adjudicate local conflict and invests them in a chief who 
now has the authority to rule over his people on behalf of the colonizer. Enlisting a powerful 
local authority was probably easier where the slave trade had already entrenched absolutist 
authority structures.  
Bates (2010) contains a concise discussion of how the integration of kinship systems like these 
into formal state structures transforms local customs into rule of law. In pre-state systems the 
heads of kin and clan met out justice (also see Murdock, 1960). Crimes are crimes against 
persons, and crimes by a member of one group against a member of another get settled by 
inter-group exchange of some kind. This is what elders and lineage heads do. A reasonable 
indicator of the incorporation of these types of authority structures into formal states is the 
appearance of crimes, not against persons, but against the state, signaling a public monopoly on 
violence -- or rule of law. Indirect colonial rule legitimized slavery-induced predatory political 
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customs and institutionalized them as part of the colonial state.7   
Customary Authority and the Post-Colonial Nation-State 
What about the post-colonial era? In this section I argue that predatory political customs passed 
through colonialism into the post-colonial era and continue to influence the structure and 
performance of African political economies today. At the federal level is the disjointed 
post-colonial nation-state facing difficulty broadcasting power. At the local level is absolutist 
customary authority. The poor governance, ethnic conflict and corruption observed in many 
post-colonial African states are unstable equilibrium outcomes on the path of play among these 
parties (Herbst, 2000; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Bates 2008; Lange, 2009; van de Walle, 2001).  
At the federal level, the path begins with the Berlin Conference of 1885 where European powers 
agreed to cooperate in carving Africa into the territories that would become post-colonial 
nation-states. The process was swift, surgical and haphazard, with colonial powers often drawing 
straight-line borders inland from the coast, and taking possession of real estate as quickly and as 
easily as they would eventually relinquish it. Davidson (1992) recounts the random and 
haphazard nature of colonial occupation on the Gold Coast. Noting that in the 1880s the King of 
Asante offered the British authorities monopoly control of all Asante trade, Davidson writes, 
"Now one might think that the British government, eager to acquire a monopoly of commercial 
control over West African lands, but far less eager to meet the almost certain high cost of 
conquest, would have jumped at this offer. But the British ministers in charge at home now 
wanted more than monopolistic commercial control; they wanted territorial ownership. Partly in 
order to keep out the French..., but even more, as most evidence seems to show, because a 
demand for territorial ownership had become an imperial obsession and even a popular cause... 
(p. 70-71)." But "no more than 60 years or so after preferring to invade … British imperial 
government found that it had little to gain, after all, from territorial possession and reverted to the 
policy of withdrawal... (p. 72)."  
7 Contrast these legal origins with the legal origins of common law in England, where custom came to rely on a 
judiciary independent of the king and lords, and based on trial by juries of peers. See Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) for 
an insightful discussion. 
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Lange (2004, 2009) tracks among the former British colonies the evolution of federal authority 
from colonialism to the present. He focuses on the disjointed post-colonial nation-state that 
emerged out of the dual legal systems of indirect rule. Lange shows how country-level measures 
of indirect rule (measured by the percent of legal cases adjudicated in customary courts) are 
highly correlated with poor governance structures today. Indirect colonial rule produced a 
post-colonial nation-state crippled by ineffective bureaucracy, restrictions on private contracting, 
weak rule of law and widespread corruption.  
Of course, indirect colonial rule could be correlated with poor post-colonial outcomes for other 
reasons. Iyer (2010), for example, shows how in British India colonial authorities indirectly ruled 
the poorer regions and directly ruled the richer ones. This kind of occupation strategy could 
produce the same correlation between indirect colonial rule and poor post-colonial governance 
that Lange finds in British Africa. As a preliminary check on this, I take country-level population 
density in 1900 (from Nunn, 2008) as a proxy for country income in 1900. A simple regression 
of indirect rule on population density has an insignificant and positive coefficient, not the 
significantly negative coefficient one would expected if indirect rule chased poor lands in Africa 
too.8 
Given weak federal authority in post-colonial Africa, one should expect pre-colonial authorities 
to continue to assert themselves. Michalopoulos and Papailoannou (2010) use satellite light 
density at night to proxy for local economic development and find that the borders of 
pre-colonial authorities explain more cross-sectional variations in economic activity than do the 
borders of post-colonial nation-states. Gennailoa and Rainer (2007) show that regions in Africa 
that had concentrated authority structures in the pre-colonial era are better-able to secure public 
goods for their constituents today.  
Patron-clientism is the glue that holds this system of authority together. It need not be deadly, but 
the cost in terms of political stability can be extremely high. Greif (1994) attributes the civil wars 
8 Indirect Rule = 0.9092 * ln(POP DENSITY 1900) + 47.024, SE = .802, R² = 0.1429. 
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of medieval Genoa to this kind of political gamesmanship. Van de Walle (2001) argues that the 
fiscal crises of the post-colonial nation-state in Africa is not due to excessive government 
spending, but to states’ inability to collect revenues from local authorities. Michalopoulos and 
Papailoannou (2011) find that much of the post-colonial political violence and civil war in Africa 
is located near pre-colonial ethnic homelands that were divided by the haphazard drawing of 
colonial borders. Divided ethnicities need not lead to conflict, but a history of slaving and the 
mistrust it engenders might be a fuel that feeds the flame (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). 
Conclusion 
I have argued in this essay that the lens of the trans-Atlantic slave trade provides a useful 
perspective on contemporary politics in Africa. My main point is that the pre-colonial authority 
structures of West Africa that are recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas are not traditional in the 
sense of being old, but are more-recent in origins and closely tied to the ways African societies 
responded to the shock of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. The image of a decentralized, absolutist, 
isolated village exploiting women is not an image of ancient African. It is a modern one. 
Second, I have nothing invested in the term “patrimonial” but I do want to suggest that the 
post-colonial nation-state in Africa is rooted in African history -- a history that has been 
fundamentally altered by the slave trades and by colonialism. This path dependence is seen in all 
of the empirical studies linking pre-colonial authority structures to post-colonial political and 
economic outcomes. My contribution to this literature is a re-interpretation of what it means to 
be “pre-colonial” in the African context. 
Finally, I do not mean to suggest that history determined post-colonial political outcomes in 
Africa, or that the political problem to be solved was as simple as I suggest. I do, however, want 
to suggest that viewing customary authority as something of recent origin can encourage change. 
“You sometimes cannot understand the logic (or illogic) of the world without knowing how it 
got that way.” Radelet (2010) identifies 17 emerging countries in Africa. Four of the five reasons 
he cites for their success have to do with improvements in policy and governance. What Ekeh 
(1975) calls the “two publics” in Africa, and what van de Walle (2001) calls “permanent crisis,” 
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and what Chabal and Daloz (1999) call “disorder as political instrument” need not be permanent 
nor disorderly. The first order of business, however, is to understand how it got that way. 
Sankofa! 
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Table 1. Sample Means 
 Western sample Atlantic sample Sub-Saharan sample 
 N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD 
 250 km radius buffers 
Slave exports (000) 200 316.05 225.62 169 374.02 238.34 131 482.52 255.32 
Absolute Authority  117 0.62 0.41 86 0.84 0.20 48 0.88 0.18 
Democratic Authority  117 0.16 0.30 86 0.07 0.17 48 0.04 0.13 
Liberal Authority  117 0.03 0.13 86 0.03 0.10 48 0.00 0.00 
Agricultural Suitability 200 2.89 1.10 169 2.99 1.11 131 2.83 0.99 
Population in 1960 200 10.73 15.36 169 9.36 15.81 131 9.91 16.74 
Elevation 200 12.56 6.58 169 11.95 6.31 131 12.12 6.18 
Forest 200 0.15 0.24 169 0.16 0.26 131 0.19 0.28 
Desert 200 0.54 0.65 169 0.53 0.69 131 0.34 0.59 
 500 km radius buffers 
Slave exports (000) 200 632.1 392.70 169 748.05 407.97 131 965.04 424.58 
Absolute Authority 180 0.59 0.39 149 0.71 0.31 111 0.80 0.21 
Democratic Authority  180 0.17 0.26 149 0.13 0.24 111 0.06 0.09 
Liberal Authority  180 0.03 0.11 149 0.04 0.12 111 0.02 0.03 
Agricultural Suitability 200 2.89 1.30 169 2.90 1.29 131 2.71 1.17 
Population in 1960 200 7.00 8.66 169 6.20 8.56 131 6.56 9.04 
Elevation 200 13.09 7.64 169 12.80 7.37 131 12.87 7.54 
Forest 200 0.27 0.47 169 0.30 0.50 131 0.36 0.55 
Desert 200 1.10 1.45 169 1.02 1.51 131 0.60 1.34 
Sources: I divide the west coast of Africa into 200 evenly spaced points starting at the northernmost 
point of Tunisia and ending at the middle of South Africa. Variables are constructed from spatial data 
falling within a radius of 250 km or 500 km around these points. The Western sample contains all 200 
buffers, from Tunis, Tunisia to Cape Town, South Africa. The Atlantic sample runs from Gibraltar to Cape 
Town. The Sub-Saharan sample runs from Cape Blanc to Cape Town. SLAVES are in thousands (0,000) of 
slaves exported from ports that fall within a buffer (Eltis, 2009). Environmental controls are forest and 
desert coverage, elevation, local agricultural suitability as measured by climate and terrain slope, and 
population density in 1960 (UNESCO, 2010; USGS, 2010; IIASA, 2010). Authority codes variable V72 in 
the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, 1967) called “Succession to the Office of Local Headman.” V72 is 
dichotomized three different ways. ABSOLUTIST = 1 for Murdock’s code 1 = “patrilineal heir,” and 
category 2 = “matrilineal heir;” ABSOLUTIST = 0 otherwise. LIBERAL = 1 for Murdock’s code 5 = 
“influence, wealth or social status, nonhereditary;” LIBERAL = 0 otherwise. DEMOCRATIC = 1 for 
Murdock’s category 6 = “election or other formal consensus, nonhereditary;” DEMOCRATIC = 0 
otherwise.  
Notes: N is the number of observations or buffers with non-missing data. Means are the un-weighted 
averages of observations in the sample. SD is sample standard deviation. 
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 Table 2. The impact of the transatlantic slave trade on absolutist authority in West Africa 
(Dependent variable = Pct. of societies with ABSOLUTIST authority) 
 Western sample Atlantic sample Sub-Saharan sample 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
 250 km radius for buffer (β�) Est. coefficient on slave exports (000,000) 0.0779*** 0.0590 0.0380*** 0.0755*** 0.0412*** 0.0636*** 
Conley standard errors 0.0230 0.1367 0.0116 0.0197 0.0133 0.0156 
Environmental controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 117 117 86 86 48 48 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4393  0.1833  0.4236  
Hansen-Sargan test of overid. restrictions  4.07  0.01  4.76 
(𝑋�) Mean slave exports (000,000)  3.260 3.260 3.740 3.740 4.825 4.825 (𝑌�) Mean pct. with Absolute Authority 62.19 62.19 84.02 84.02 88.1 88.1 
β�*𝑋�*100 25.40 19.23 14.20 28.24 19.87 30.67 
Pct. of Absolutism (𝑌�) explained by (𝑋�)   40.84 30.92 16.90 33.61 22.56 34.81 
 500 km radius for buffer (β�) Est. coefficient on slave exports (000,000) 0.0225* 0.177*** 0.0040 0.0342 0.0080 0.0134 
Conley standard errors 0.0157 0.0079 0.0105 0.0431 0.0082 0.0129 
Environmental controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 180 180 149 149 111 111 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2234  0.0535  0.3781  
Hansen-Sargan test of overid. restrictions  10.03  6.16  1.91 
(𝑋�) Mean slave exports (000,000) 6.321 6.321 7.480 7.480 9.650 9.650 (𝑌�) Mean pct. with Absolute Authority 58.72 58.72 70.94 70.94 79.78 79.78 
β�*𝑋�*100 14.21 11.2 3.00 25.56 7.68 12.91 
Pct. of Absolutism (𝑌�) explained by (𝑋�) 24.19 190.82 4.23 36.03 9.62 16.19 
Sources: See Table 1.  
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Notes: The coefficients in the columns labeled “OLS” are estimated OLS. The 2-stage estimates in the column labeled “IV” were estimated GMM. 
*** denotes 99% confidence level. ** denotes 95% confidence level. * denotes 90% confidence level. All 2-tail tests. The Hansen-Sargan test 
statistic of over-identification restrictions is distributed Chi-Square with 2 degrees of freedom. The critical value for the 90% confidence level is 
4.61 (that the IV regressors are not excluded from the equation). Conley standard errors allowed for spatial correlation over five contiguous 
buffers for the 250 km buffers and over 10 contiguous buffers for the 500 km buffers.  
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Table 3. First-stage IV regressions 
(Dependent variable = slave exports in thousands) 
 250 km radius buffer 500 km radius buffer 
 Western 
sample 
Atlantic 
sample 
Sub-Saharan 
sample 
Western 
sample 
Atlantic 
sample 
Sub-Saharan 
sample 
Distance to American destinations -4.38*** -3.04* -5.74 -7.46*** -5.84** 10.81 
 (1.23) (2.10) (8.76) (2.26) (3.06) (17.39) 
Distance to N. African destinations -2.23 3.80 0.74 -5.20 3.93 30.93 
 (2.95) (8.39) (16.79) (4.50) (14.68) (35.26) 
Agricultural suitability 32.57*** 50.19** 18.97 152.76*** 181.57*** 142.95* 
 (1.23) (30.71) (37.96) (51.63) (60.40) (82.21) 
Population in 1960 4.24*** 3.92 4.74* 10.17** 11.45** 6.94 
 (1.60) (4.88) (2.47) (5.65) (6.91) (5.97) 
Elevation -10.01*** -14.19*** -13.23*** -24.45*** -31.75*** -21.75 
 (3.73) (4.88) (6.44) (7.50) (9.97) (16.00) 
Forest 165.77 140.03 164.67 297.00* 275.11* 283.91* 
 (169.24) (177.82) (182.24) (157.91) (160.36) (159.08) 
Desert -88.67** -114.67** -132.72** -105.47*** -113.82** -113.60** 
 (35.56) (51.61) (56.86) (39.76) (53.62) (53.75) 
Constant 540.60** 154.63 538.73 884.87*** 316.41 -2061.30 
 (223.24) (536.71) (1378.22) (324.80) (881.03) (2792.58) 
Number of observations 200 169 131 200 169 131 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.3515 0.3367 0.2865 0.6037 0.5941 0.5286 
F-statistic 16.41 13.18 8.46 44.31 36.13 21.82 
Sources: See Table 1.  
Notes: Coefficients estimated OLS. Conley standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes 99% confidence level. ** denotes 95% confidence level. * 
denotes 90% confidence level. All 2-tail tests. Conley standard errors allow for spatial correlation over five contiguous buffers for the 250 km 
buffers and over 10 contiguous buffers for the 500 km buffers.   
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Table 4. The impact of the transatlantic slave trade on LIBERAL authority in West Africa 
(Dependent variable = Pct. of polities with LIBERAL authority) 
 Western sample Atlantic sample Sub-Saharan sample 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
 250 km radius for buffer (β�) Est. coefficient on slave exports (000,000) -0.0084 -0.0247 -0.0068* -0.0044 NA NA 
Conley standard errors 0.0063 0.0269 0.0041 0.0063   
Environmental controls YES YES YES YES   
Number of observations 117 117 86 86   
Adjusted R-squared 0.0313 
 
0.11 
 
  
Hansen-Sargan test of overid. restrictions 
 
0.83 
 
3.363   
 500 km radius for buffer (β�) Est. coefficient on slave exports (000,000) -0.0037* -0.0084 -0.0057** -0.0125** -0.0031** -0.0070** 
Conley standard errors 0.0022 0.0087 0.0024 0.0056 0.0016 0.0031 
Environmental controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 180 180 149 149 111 111 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1671 
 
0.1759 
 
0.2823 
 Hansen-Sargan test of overid. restrictions 
 
1.66 
 
0.0010 
 
2.37 
Sources: See Table 1.  
Notes: The coefficients in the columns labeled “OLS” are estimated OLS. The 2-stage estimates in the columns labeled “IV” were estimated 
GMM. *** denotes 99% confidence level. ** denotes 95% confidence level. * denotes 90% confidence level. All 2-tail tests. The Hansen-Sargan 
test statistic of over-identification restrictions is distributed Chi-Square with 2 degrees of freedom. The critical value for the 90% confidence level 
is 4.61 (that the IV regressors are not excluded from the equation). Conley standard errors allowed for spatial correlation over five contiguous 
buffers for the 250 km buffers and over 10 contiguous buffers for the 500 km buffers. 
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Table 5. The impact of the transatlantic slave trade on democratic authority in West Africa 
(Dependent variable = Pct. of polities with DEMOCRATIC authority) 
 Western sample Atlantic sample Sub-Saharan sample 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
 250 km radius for buffer (β�) Est. coefficient on slave exports (000,000) -0.0456** -0.0357 -0.0081 -0.0210* -0.0067 -0.0044 
Conley standard errors 0.0196 0.1211 0.0057 0.0126 0.0053 0.0071 
Environmental controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 117 117 86 86 48 48 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1129 
 
0.2174 
 
0.6961 
 Hansen-Sargan test of overid. restrictions 
 
3.04 
 
0.1483 
 
1.52 
 500 km radius for buffer (β�) Est. coefficient on slave exports (000,000) -0.0185** -0.0935*** -0.0072 -0.0193 -0.0020 -0.0095 
Conley standard errors 0.0083 0.0341 0.0064 0.0259 0.0041 0.0066 
Environmental controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 180 180 149 149 111 111 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1618 
 
0.1188 
 
0.2238 
 Hansen-Sargan test of overid. restrictions 
 
3.17 
 
7.83 
 
0.0820 
Sources: See Table 1.  
Notes: The coefficients in the columns labeled “OLS” are estimated OLS. The 2-stage estimates in the column labeled “IV” were estimated GMM. 
*** denotes 99% confidence level. ** denotes 95% confidence level. * denotes 90% confidence level. All 2-tail tests. The Hansen-Sargan test 
statistic of over-identification restrictions is distributed Chi-Square with 2 degrees of freedom. The critical value for the 90% confidence level is 
4.61 (that the IV regressors are not excluded from the equation). Conley standard errors allowed for spatial correlation over five contiguous 
buffers for the 250 km buffers and over 10 contiguous buffers for the 500 km buffers.   
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Figure 2. The slave trade and indirect rule 
 
Indirect = 4.9227*** (SLAVES) + 36.262 
R² = 0.5165 
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Figure 1. Merging the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database and the Ethnographic Atlas 
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